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Abstract 
We propose a fragile watermarking scheme for  authen- 
ticating images based on the Yeung-Mintzer [ I ]  scheme. 
This scheme does provide a betterprotection against all the 
attackspmposed for  Yeung-Minfzer scheme. A polar set de- 
rived from the image blocks is used in the embedding pro- 
cess. The aenterpixel values of image blocks are perturbed 
by sniall quantities in such a way that the perceptual quality 
of the image is not modijied. We also analyse the security 
level with respect to other attacks. 
1 Introduction 
The aim of authentication is to protect the information 
being transmitted. Cryptography provides the means for 
accomplishing the authenticity of the information being re- 
ceivedlsent and guarantees that the information has not been 
tampered with. Hash function protects the integrity of the 
information by impacting much on the hash digest for even 
a single bit change. For images this level of protection is 
not so important because a change in a single pixel value 
will virtually have no impact on the impression of the im- 
age. Watermarking as opposed to cryptographic tool pro- 
vides a sufficient amount of protection while localising the 
tampered areas without having to store additional informa- 
tion. This is accomplished at the expense of slightly modi- 
fying the pixel values. 
2 Previous Schemes 
An early proposal for a fragile watermark is found in 
[3].  In this, Walton proposes to hide key dependent check- 
sums of the seven most significant bits (MSB) of gray scales 
along pseudo random walks in the least significant bits 
(LSB) of pixels forming the walk. The main drawback of 
this scheme is that if the random walk is guessed it is easy 
to attack the image. 
Wong’s method of fragile watermarking scheme based 
on cryptographic hash function is found in [Z]. In this be 
proposes a fragile water marking scheme which divides an 
image into blocks, calculates the hash value from MSB of 
the pixels and embeds the hash sequence in the LSB of the 
pixels. The main drawback of this scheme is that it is sub- 
ject to collage attack if the block sizes are known. 
In Honsinger’s scheme [6] the original image can be 
recovered if the watermark image has been found to he au- 
thentic. 
3 Our Proposal 
We propose a new fragile watermarking scheme which 
tries to avoid the attacks proposed for Yeung-Mintzer 
scheme. Their scheme is subject to two types of attacks. 
The first one assumes that two or more images have been 
embedded with a watermark using the same binary logo 
and look up table [4] [5]. The second one which is also 
known as the collage attack assumes that portions of two 
or more images that have been embedded watermarks using 
the same binary logo and look up table can be put together 
to construct a new watermark image. To eliminate the weak 
points we embed the watermark on the center pixel values 
of image blocks in such a way that the polarity of those 
pixel points are not disturbed during the verification pro- 
cess unless the image has been tampered with. Even if the 
same logo and table look up are used on different images, 
choosing the polarity unique to each image will avoid the 
first attack to greater extend. This will happen because the 
polarity of the center pixel of the image blocks which dif- 
fer from image to image are taken into consideration during 
embedding. This method of embedding marks unique to 
each image will also avoid the combination of marked pix- 
els in determining or guessing the logo and look up table, 
and also the collage attack. The collage attack is somewhat 
protected because combining portions of different images 
wouldn’t give the same sequence of polarity as the original 
one. 
The idea of this fragile watermarking scheme come from 
Yeung-Mintzer’s scheme and our critical set based frag- 
ile watermarking scheme. In our proposed watermarking 
scheme [XI critical points are derived from taking the differ- 
ence between the original image and the low pass image and 
keeping the co-ordinates which have the differences above 
a certain threshold as critical points. 
1 
Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Image and Signal Processing and Analysis (2003) 860 
In this scheme, we determine the polarity of the center 
pixel of an image block by determining if the difference be- 
tween the center pixel of the image block and the mean of 
the image block pixels is greater than zero or not. If the dif- 
ference is greater than zero, we say it is a peak point, having 
positive polarity, else we say it is a valley point, having neg- 
ative polarity. If the difference is a positive one increasing 
the center pixel value of the image block wouldn’t change 
the polarity of the center pixel. If the difference is a nega- 
tive one decreasing the center pixel value of the image block 
wouldn’t change the polarity of the center pixel. The idea of 
polarity of image pixel come from [9 ] ,  where the polarity 
of VQ indices are XORed with watermarked image to ob- 
tain the key. The properties mentioned above will allow the 
polarity of center pixels of image blocks to he in tact during 
watermark recovery. We construct an algorithm preserving 
the above properties. 
3.1 Watermark Embedding 
1. Given an image I, divide it into blocks of size a x b. 
2. Let B1, Ba, ..., B, be the blocks of size a x bordered 
according to raster scan of the image I. 
3. Let C1,CaI ..., C,, be the center pixels of the im- 
age blocks B1, Ba, ..., B, and let Zl,Zz, ..., Z, he the 
mean of image blocks B1, Bz,  __., B,. 
4. The polarity of the center pixels C1, Cz, ..., C,, are de- 
termined by finding the difference between C; and Zi 
for each block B;. If Ci - Zi > 0, then C; is said 
to have positive polarity (’+’), else Ci is said to have 
negative polarity (’-’). 
5 .  Let PI,Pz,  ..., P,, he the polarity of the center pixels 
CI, Ca, ..., C, of the blocks B1, B2, .._, B,. 
6. Let L = { 1 1 , / 2 ,  ..., l , ,} he  the raster scanned binary 
map of the logo. 
7. Let fpos : {0, 1, . . , ‘255}  + {O, l} defines the look up 
table of positive polar center pixels for a particular key. 
8. Let fries : {0,1, . . ,255} + {0, l} defines the look 
up table of negative polar center pixels for a particular 
key. 
9. For each center pixel from C1 to C, 
if fpos(Ci) = l i  and Pi = ’’ +” then do not modify C, 
else if fnev(Ci) = li and P; = ” - ” then do not 
modify Ci 
else if Pi = ” +” then increase Ci by a value of 6 until 
else if Pi = ” -” then decrease C; by a value of 6 until 
fpo.(G + 6) = l i  
f,,eg(C, - 6) = li 
3.2 Verification Algorithm 
1. Upon receiving an image IT, divide it into blocks of 
size a x b. 
2. Let E;, B;, ..., B; he the blocks of size a x bordered 
according to raster scan of the image I?. 
3. Let C[,C;, ..., C; be the center pixels of the im- 
age blocks B;, B;, ..., B; and let Zy,G, ..., 5: be the 
mean of image blocks B;, B;, ..., E;. 
4. Let F‘;, P . ,  ..., P,’ be the polarity of the center pixels 
Cy, C;, ..., CY, of the blocks B;, B;, ._., B, as defined 
above. 
5. Let Z;,lg, ..., 1: be the logo sequence extracted using 
the procedure defined in the next step. 
6. For each center pixel from C1 to C,, 
if P; = ” + ” then extract 1,‘ as fpoa(C;) and 
if Pi = ” - ” then extract 1; as fnes(C;) 
For each center pixel from C1 to C, 
if 1; = l i  then the received image 1‘ has not been tam- 
pered with. if for some blocks 1: = 1; do not hold, that 
portion of the image has been tampered with. 
4 Experimental Results 
We performed experiments on Lena, Peppers, Pills, Pa- 
per, and Corrosion images to verify if the polarities of the 
center pixels of the original image blocks remain the same 
as the polarity of the center pixels of the watermarked image 
blocks. As expected polarity of the image blocks remained 
the same. We also looked at the quality of the image after 
embedding by computing PSNR values. Our experiments 
revealed that exact recovery of the logo was possible on all 
five images. PSNR values never became less than 32 on all 
images. Table 1 shows the block sizes chosen for embed- 
ding and the PSNR values that measure the image fidelity. 
For each block size, appropriate size logos were chosen to 
incorporate entire blocks of the image. 
We also embedded the same logo (Figure l(a)) on all five 
images and extracted them to see the visual quality degrada- 
tion caused to the logo due to embedding. Figures l(b)-(f) 
show the extracted logo from Lena, Peppers, Pills, Paper, 
and Corrosion images. 
5 Drawbacks and Possible Remedies 
This method is subject to similar attacks proposed for 
Yeung-Mintzer scheme. Some possible protection methods 
against this attacks are as follows. 
1. Randomize pixel selection within each block: 
This could be done by choosing a random pixel in each 
block rather than choosing a center pixel. 
861 Proc. ISPAO3 





11 size I (200x200) I (200x200) j (130x200) I (132x200) 1 (137x200) I 
11 5x5 1 65.002 I 65.090 I 34.468 I 41.877 I 32.514 I 
71.318 71.229 34.471 41.893 32.516 
75.231 74.875 34.472 41.896 32.516 
77.339 76.908 34.472 41.896 32.517 
78.13 79.837 34.472 41.897 32.517 
Figure 1. (a) Original Logo (b) Logo on Lena 
(c) Logo on Peppers (d) Logo on Pills (e) Logo 
on Paper (f) Logo on Corrosion 
Randomize block selection in embedding: 
In embedding, instead of choosing the blocks in a 
raster scan of an image, choose the blocks in a random 
order. 
More than one Look Up Tables(LUTs): 
To enhance protection, choose more than one LUT. For 
example, LUT one for center pixels with positive po- 
larity and LUT two for center pixels with negative po- 
larity. 
6 Advantages of the Scheme 
Some advantages of the scheme are as follows: 
I .  Embedding information in this way on the center 
pixels of image blocks would not disturb or influ- 
ence the neighbouring blocks at all. This IS be- 
cause non-overlapping blocks are chosen in the em- 
beddinglextraction process. 
2. Localization of the manipulations is possible because 
the blocks used in the embeddinglextraction process 
are uniformly spread over the image. 
3. There is no syncronization loss during logo recovery 
due to embedding information or manipulation of the 
watermarked image. The size of the embedded logo 
sequence will always be the same as the sire of the 
recovered logo sequence. 
7 Possible Improvements: Multiple Water- 
marks 
7.1 Variance Rased 
Since the variance of image blocks can be at various 
ranges, it should he possible to divide the image into var- 
ious regions based on block variances. For example, if a set 
of blocks with variances ranging from 0 to l 1  forms a region 
RI and a set of blocks with variances ranging from l1 + 6 
to l 2  forms a region Rz,  it should he possible to embed two 
logos by choosing I I ,  12 and 6 appropriately. Note that a 
gap or a buffer of 6 must he kept between adjacent ranges 
of variances inorder to avoid bock variances moving from 
one range to another due to change in variance caused by 
embedding. Ranges for variances must be chosen in such 
a way that the number of blocks falling in those ranges is 
equal to the logo sizes. 
7.2 K-mean Rased 
Since the center pixels of image blocks can be obtained 
at various regions, it should he possible to embed multiple 
watermarks. For example, if a set of center pixels of im- 
age blocks are captured in a region RI forming a set one, 
and another set of center pixels of image blocks are cap- 
tured in a region Rz forming a set two, it should be possible 
to embed two logos. Using k-means on feature vectors of 
pixel points for segmenting watermarked images might end 
up in wrong region recovery, and hence lead to syncroniza- 
tion loss. Voronoi diagram as used in [7] is a favorable one 
for segmenting watermarked images, because the regions 
would not change due to watermark embedding. This is be- 
cause the centroids on pixel positions, rather than the pixels 
values, are used as keys. 
7.3 A Comparison between Variance and K- 
means Rased Methods 
Our experiments show both the methods perform equally 
well. The first method involves computation of variances 
of each block, finding the ranges for block grouping, and 
finally embedding a logo in each group of blocks. The sec- 
ond one involves segmenting the image into various regions 
using k-means and choosing each region blocks for embed- 
ding a logo. To decide on performance level of the above 
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U two methods, one has to take the following into considera- tion. I .  Amount of computation involved 2. Security level 
Figure 2 shows the two logos that are embedded in Pep- 
pers image, choosing variances of image blocks at two dif- 
ferent ranges and the sdme logos extracted from the water- 
marked image. 
Figure 2. (a) and (b) are embedded logos and 
(c) and (d) are extracted logos 
Figure 3 shows the three logos that are embedded in Pep- 
pers image after the image bas been segmented into three 
regions by kmeans algorithm using the centroids (23,88), 
( I  15,39) and (93,162) trained on image pixel locations. The 
segmented regions and the three logos that have been recov- 
ered are also shown. 
8 Security Analysis 
8.1 Block Size as a Key 
Since center pixel of adjacent blocks are chosen for em- 
bedding, block sizes could he chosen as keys. By choos- 
ing varying size blocks for embedding, the security of the 
scheme could he enhanced, 
8.2 Seed of PRNG as a key 
To accomplish randomization of pixel selection, a 
pseudo random number generator (PRNG) could he used 
with a distinct seed for each image. 
8.2.1 Randomize Pixel Selection within a Block 
Instead of choosing the center pixel of image blocks for em- 
bedding a binary hit of a logo, an arbitrary pixel in a block 
could be chosen. This randomization of pixel selection will 
avoid all the attacks proposed for Yeung-Mintzer scheme. 
Figure 3. (a) Three Voronoi regions chosen (b) 
embedded logos and (c) extracted logos 
8.2.2 Randomize Block Selection within an Image 
Instead of choosing the blocks in a raster scan of an ini- 
age for embedding binary bits of a logo, an arbitrary block 
within the image could be chosen. This randomization 
of block selection will avoid all the attacks proposed for 
Yeung-Mintzer scheme. 
8.3 Binary Look Up Table as a Key 
It has already been proposed that if the embedded pixel 
points of two or more images with a same logo are known, 
the binary look up table can easily he guessed. Therefore, 
major security of our scheme must come from hiding the 
embedded pixel points rather than hiding the binary lookup 
table. Unlike our scheme in [SI, we do not need alternating 
zeros and ones in the binary look up table to reduce the 
syncronization loss during recovery. That is, there is no 
major restriction on the type of LUTs. As in Yeung-Mintzer 
scheme, as long as the LUT has randomized zeros and ones, 
this scheme should perform well. 
We did experiments to verify how much watermarked 
images and extracted logos would change from the original 
ones for different sequences of 0's  and 1's in the look up 
table. As expected highest alternating look up tables (ie. 
1010 ... or 0101 ... ) produced the best PSNR values for wa- 
termarked images. This was because the highest alternating 
look up tables produced the least changes in pixel values 
during embedding. (Table 2 and Figure 4) 
8.4 Centroids as keys 
In our region based method, there can be several regions 
chosen depending on the number of centroids used. The 
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1 LUT I PSNR (Image) 1 PSNR (Logo) ] 
110011 ... 60.902 Infinity 
0001 1 1 ... 57.043 Infinity 
Table 2. Look up tables, PSNR values of wa- 
termarked image and extracted logo 
Figure 4. (a) Original logo and the logo ex- 
tracted from watermarked image when (b) 
random LUT (c) LUT with 0101.. (d) LUT with 
1010.. (e) LUT with 0011.. (f) LUT with 1100.. 
(9) LUT with 000111 and (h) LUT with 111000 
are used 
locations of those centroids can he numerous. The number 
of centroids determines the number of logos that could be 
embedded. The locations of those centroids determine the 
regions in which the logos are embedded. Since the regions 
chosen are arbitrary, the centroids of those regions can he 
used as keys. 
9 Size of Key Space 
9.1 Block Sizes as Keys 
If the image size is m x n, the number of blocks that 
could be chosen can range from 1 to m x n, assuming the 
size of blocks range from 1 x 1 to m x n. If we consider 
only square blocks of size p x p ,  the maximum number of 
square blocks within an image of size m x n will he equal 
to m / p  x nlp. In this case, the size of the key space will be 
equal t o n  (ifn < m) or m (if m < n). 
9.2 Seed of a PRNG as a Key 
9.2.1 
Suppose equal size blocks are chosen for embedding, the 
number of possible choices for choosing a pixel within a 
block of size p x p will he equal top x p .  Therefore, the 
size of the key space will he equal to ( p  x p)("lpX"lp) .  To 
miximize the size of the key space for an image of size m x 
n, an appropriate value f o r p  must be chosen. 
Arbitrary Pixel within a Block 
9.2.2 Arbitrary Block within an Image 
Assuming the block sizes are p x p ,  there can be maximum 
of m/p x nlp blocks in an image of size m x n. Suppose 
a logo of size mfp x n/p is to be embedded, choosing the 
blocks in a random order, the size of the key space will be 
equal to (mlp x nlp)!. 
9.3 Binary Look Up Table as a Key 
There are altogether possible look up tables. Out of 
these tables, The hest once for the least modification of the 
images are 0101 .... and 1010 .... If the maximum number 
of consecutive 0's and 1's are kept within 3, there will he 
several possible tables to choose from. 
10 A Comparison Between Bhattacharjee's 
Scheme and Ours 
Bhattacharjee's scheme some what resembles our multi- 
ple watermaring scheme and hence we give a comparison 
between our scheme and theirs. 
1. Their scheme uses Maxican-hat wavelet for feature 
point detection, whereas ours uses the center pixels of 
image blocks for feature extraction. 
2. In their scheme, Voronoi regions are formed choos- 
ing the feature points determined as centroids. In our 
scheme, Voronoi regions are determined based on cen- 
troids trained on arbitrary initial points. 
3. Spread spectrum watermarking has been recom- 
mended for marking each region in their scheme. We 
use Yeung-Mintzer scheme for embedding marks on 
center pixels of image blocks. We use polarity of cen- 
ter pixels as additional information in embedding. 
4. They do not have sufficient explanation for choosing 
the feature points as centroids of Voronoi regions. We 
choose arbitrary points as centroids of Voronoi regions. 
5. Their main reason for watermarking is copyright pro- 
tection, thus robustness plays a vital role than fragility. 
Our main reason for watermarking is authentication, 
thus fragility plays a vital role than robustness. 
6. Since their scheme is designed for copyright protec- 
tion, it has not been made key dependent. Since ours 
is for authentication, it has been made key dependent 
by hiding the pixel points chosen within each block as 
well as the blocks chosen for embedding. 
7. In their case, multiple spread spectrum can he embed- 
ded by choosing each one for each region, whereas 
in ours, multiple logos can be embedded by choosing 
each logo for each region. 
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11 Performance evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of our scheme, after em- 
bedding the logo, we performed the following attacks on 
the watermarked image: JPEG compression at quality level 
of 90, blurring, embossing, horizontal flipping, oil-painting, 
rotation to one degree, vertical flipping, sharpening, cutting- 
I, cutting-2, copy and paste-1, copy and paste-2. Unlike our 
scheme in [8], we were able to recover the embedded logo 
in a distorted form from the watermarked images for all the 
attacks mentioned above. This was because the sire of the 
image blocks and the size of the image remained the same 
during the process of embedding and extraction. The recov- 
ered logo for all attacks mention above are shown in Figure 
6. Some geometric attacks on Peppers image and the recov- 
ered logos for those attacks have also been shown in Figures 
5 and 6 to illustrate the localization of manipulation. The 
recovery of logos from all attacked images and the localiza- 
tion of manipulations show the superior performance of our 
scheme. 
Figure 5. (a) cutting-1 (b) cutting-2 (c) copy 
and paste-1 and (d) copy and paste-2 a t t acks  
on Peppers image 
Figure 6. L o g o  recovered from (a) J P E G  com- 
pression at quality level 90 (b) blurring (c) em- 
bossing (d) horizontal  flipping (e) oilpainting 
(f) rotation (9) vertical flipping (h) s h a r p e n i n g  
(i) cutting-1 (j) cutting-’2 (k) copy and paste-1 
and (I) copy and paste-2 
12 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a new fragile watermark- 
ing scheme which embeds the marks on the center pixels of 
image blocks based on the polarity of the pixels. The polar- 
ity of these points are in tact even after embedding the marks 
unless the image has been tampered with. This scheme pre- 
vents the two main attacks proposed for Yeung-Mintzer’s 
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scheme. The security level of the scheme and the possible 
extension to multiple watermarking scheme are also inves- 
tigated. 
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